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Corporate governance in a risk society 
 
Abstract 
 Under conditions of growing interconnectedness of the global economy more and more 
stakeholders are exposed to risks and costs resulting from business activities that are neither 
regulated nor compensated for by means of national governance. The changing distribution of 
risks poses a threat to the legitimacy of business firms that normally derive their legitimacy 
from operating in compliance with the legal rules of democratic nation states. However, dur-
ing the process of globalization the regulatory power of nation states has been weakened and 
many production processes have been shifted to states with weak regulatory frameworks 
where businesses operate outside the reach of the democratic nation state. As a result, busi-
ness firms have to address the various legitimacy challenges of their operations directly and 
cannot rely upon the legitimacy of their regulatory environment. These developments chal-
lenge the dominant approach to corporate governance that regards shareholders as the only 
stakeholder group in need of special protection due to risks not covered by contracts and legal 
regulations. On the basis of these considerations, we argue for a democratization of corporate 
governance structures in order to compensate for the governance deficits in their regulatory 
environment and to cope with the changing allocation of risks and costs. By way of demo-
cratic involvement of various stakeholders, business firms may be able to mitigate the redis-
tribution of individual risk and to address the resulting legitimacy deficits even when operat-
ing under conditions of regulatory gaps and governance failure. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
With the power and latitude of firms in a globalized economy rapidly expanding, their actions 
affect an ever wider range of individuals, such as workers in complex global supply chains, 
persons affected by pollution or other kinds of negative externalities, although the firms in 
many cases are not legally accountable to these individuals. Consequently, more and more 
stakeholders of business firms are individually exposed to risks and costs resulting from the 
operations of business firms in cases where the regulatory power of national governments is 
incapable of mitigating or socializing these risks. That is, the harmful consequences of the 
activities of business firms are imposed on individuals without their consent and without pro-
tection through regulatory frameworks: ‘the burden of risk migrates from the jurisdiction of 
institutions to the individualized sphere of personal decision-making’ (Mythen, 2005, p. 130). 
This individualization of risks beyond the reach of regulatory protection is a major feature of 
contemporary society, which has been characterized as a risk society by Beck (Beck, 1992, 
1999). Business firms are an important source of risks in risk society (Matten, 2004; see also 
Gephard et al., 2009). Therefore, the individualization of risks is a threat to the legitimacy of 
a firm, i.e. its social acceptance (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995). Since legitima-
cy is a vital condition for an organization such cases potentially jeopardize the survival of the 
firm (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
 The dominant approach to corporate governance advocates the primacy of shareholders 
(Daily et al., 2003; Judge, 2009) due to the residual risk borne by shareholders (Easterbrook 
and Fischel, 1996; Williamson, 1985; see also, critically, Stout, 2002) and the efficiency 
alledgedly accruing from the concentration of corporate governance on the generation of 
shareholder value (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Jensen, 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004; see also, critically, Elhauge, 2005). The first aim of this paper is to show that this ap-
proach to corporate governance – as well as many alternative approaches – neither adequately 
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consider the risks accruing from changing economic and political conditions of business 
firms operating in a global environment nor the resulting legitimacy problems of business 
firms. The second aim is to develop an alternative conception of corporate governance that 
can better address the individualization of risk by means of a democratization of corporate 
governance. We extend current research on the inclusion of stakeholders in corporate govern-
ance (see e.g. Driver and Thompson, 2002; Gomez and Korine, 2005, 2008; Scherer et al., 
2012) in several respects: First, we identify an increasing exposure of individual stakeholders 
to the risks and costs that emanate from business activities and analyse the incompatibility of 
this development with shareholder-centered approaches to corporate governance. Second, we 
elaborate a selection criterion for stakeholders who should be represented in corporate gov-
ernance. Third, we conceptualize the required democratization – by law and soft law – of 
corporate governance as a means for governments and transnational organizations to indirect-
ly tackle global governance gaps. 
 The paper is structured as follows: In the second section, two central justifications of 
the shareholder-centered conception of corporate governance will be delineated and their ap-
propriateness vis-a-vis the shifting division of power between economic and political actors 
and the resulting individualization of risk will be explored. In addition, we will discuss alter-
native approaches to corporate governance regarding their potential to address these issues. In 
section three, we will argue that a shift in the scope of corporate governance is necessary to 
appropriately determine which stakeholders need to be included in corporate governance. In 
the fourth section, we suggest how democratic processes can be implemented in organiza-
tions to guarantee a fair allocation of risk and to legitimize corporate power. The approach of 
deliberative democracy to corporations will be discussed as a possible conceptual foundation 
of this endeavour. These ideas will be exemplified by referencing the empirical example of 
stakeholder panels. A conclusion and suggestions for further research complete this paper. 
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Challenges for the shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance 
In this section we show that the shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance is 
justified by the residual risk borne by shareholders as well as by the socially beneficial effects 
alledgedly accruing from the maximization of shareholder value. We suggest that both argu-
mentations become questionable due to the changes resulting from globalization and the re-
sulting reallocation of risk from the producers of risk and the societal level towards individu-
als. 
Risk and efficiency as the foundations of dominant corporate governance theory and 
practice 
 The shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance can be traced back to prob-
lems arising from the changing relation between ownership and control of businesses, first 
described by Berle and Means (1932). According to their study, an increase in the number of 
shareholders of corporations diminished the capacity of individual shareholders to control 
corporations. Professional managers gained influence and the owners lost the capacity to 
monitor the behavior of the managers. Assuming utility-maximizing behavior of the manag-
ers, shareowners ran the risk of managers utilizing the money supplied to the company to 
maximize their own utility rather than maximizing corporate value and, thus, the value of 
shares. Consequently, a control mechanism, which prevented the managers from shirking and 
misusing their fiduciary function, became necessary (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). From this 
perspective, corporate governance can be described as a mechanism aimed at minimizing the 
risk borne by shareholders, who are regarded as the owners of a firm. 
 In the course of the advancement of the economic theory of the firm, the conception of 
corporations was further developed: initially seen as the sum of the invested capital owned by 
the investors, corporations were redefined as a nexus of contracts (Coase, 1937; Easterbrook 
and Fischel, 1996) – bringing into equilibrium the conflicting objectives of individuals (Jen-
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sen and Meckling, 1976). Whereas most contractual partners such as employees, debtors, and 
suppliers have well defined claims on a firm and therefore bear no risk due to the enforceabil-
ity of their contractual claims by legal sanctions, shareholders need to rely on the manage-
ment to maximize their return by maximizing the firm value, since profit cannot be deter-
mined a priori. The relation of owners and managers of publicly traded corporations has been 
explained by the principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), highlighting the situa-
tion of asymmetric information between shareowners (principals) and managers (agents) and 
determining the optimal incentives necessary to prevent managers from shirking and thus 
motivating them to maximize firm value and simultaneously the value of shares. The (residu-
al) risk associated with the uncertainty concerning the extent of the residual claims is regard-
ed as the justification for the shareholders to have the right to appropriate the difference be-
tween revenue and cost, namely the residual claims (profit) (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996; 
Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004) and therefore an important justification for shareholder-centered 
approaches to corporate governance (Stout, 2002). 
 A further justification of the shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance 
relates to the efficiency alleged to result from the maximization of share value. According to 
this view, corporate governance focussing on shareholder primacy is justified in the follow-
ing way: shareholder value is regarded as a single indicator by which shareholders and the 
market for securities can assess managerial performance (Jensen, 2002). The assumption cen-
tral to this justification of corporate governance is the view that market-based allocation is 
most efficient in serving the public interest if extra-economic interferences are minimized 
(Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). According to this position, the mechanism of corporate gov-
ernance remedies the problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control in the 
most efficient manner by means of the market mechanism. The market for securities assesses 
corporate performance by means of the share price. Consequently, managers are induced to 
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signal their performance by the maximization of the value of the shares of the corporation 
they work for. Further, the maximization of the value of a corporation’s shares maximizes the 
overall productivity and value of the firm (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Maximal productivi-
ty of a firm, in turn, is seen as the optimal contribution to social welfare, assuming that the 
firm is a value generating entity and the output of efficient firms is higher than the input. 
Since each unit of surplus (profit) adds to social welfare, the latter is maximized by the max-
imization of profits (Jensen, 2002). That is, by means of market coordination private profit is 
aligned with the public interest as long as the maximization of shareholder value takes place 
within the borders of legal and moral obligations (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). Both the re-
sidual risk borne by shareholders and the maximization of social welfare through the maxi-
mization of shareholder value can be regarded as strong moral justifications for the primacy 
of shareholders in corporate governance, as the debate on the control of business firms 
throughout the 20th century illustrates (Berle, 1932; Friedman, 1970; Langtry, 1994). 
Globalization, corporate governance, and the individualization of risk 
 The dominant shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance relies on the fact 
that business activities take place within the borders of legal and moral obligations. However, 
this assumption becomes questionable in light of the diminishing regulatory capacity of na-
tion states and the concomitant increase of power of business firms. In the following, we ana-
lyse in detail how these changes, which we regard as important facets of globalization and 
risk society, challenge the justifications of shareholder-oriented corporate governance theory. 
 Globalization can be understood as the process of expanding social relations across na-
tional borders due to declining costs of transportation, communication, and coordination 
(Beck, 2000). In the course of this process distances and borders are losing their significance 
and the scope of action of multinational corporations has expanded considerably (Chandler 
and Mazlish, 2005; Strange, 2000). Concurrently, despite the state’s monopoly of the use of 
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force, the effectiveness of national politics can be doubted in cases where corporate power as 
well as externality and public goods problems transcend national borders and become global. 
The increasing influence and power of multinational enterprises on the one hand and the 
weakening of the power of states on the other hand result in regulation gaps (Beck, 2000; 
Chandler and Mazlish, 2005; Kobrin, 2001).  
 In the course of the shift of power between nation states and business firms corpora-
tions play an ambiguous role (Scherer et al., 2009). On the one hand, they contribute to the 
efficient solution of public goods problems and engage in activities that were traditionally 
seen as the domain of nation states. Private actors such as businesses, NGOs, and civil socie-
ty groups are engaging in the definition and enforcement of global rules and the production of 
public goods and thereby contribute to a new form of global governance that partly compen-
sates for the diminishing steering power of national governance. Ranging from the provision 
of infrastructure and education (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), the administration of rights 
(Matten and Crane, 2005a) to involvement in rulemaking on the global scale and to the gen-
eration of soft law (Abbott and Snidal, 2009), corporations take on a political role besides 
their generic economic role (Beck, 2008; Scherer et al., 2006). On the other hand, societal 
peace is threatened by the activities of private business firms. Examples are political lobbying 
benefitting corporations at the expense of the public interest (Barley, 2007), the complicity 
with human rights violations (Kinley and Nolan, 2008), and externalities such as environ-
mental degradation (Osland, 2003). 
 The implications of globalization and the increasing political power of business have 
been reflected in the business literature (Scherer et al., 2006) but have been considered in 
corporate governance research only to a limited extent (Scherer et al., 2012). While there is at 
least some work on the link between corporate governance and CSR (Bhimani and Soonawal-
la, 2005; Jamali et al., 2008), the challenges of globalization for the dominant corporate gov-
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ernance model have barely been addressed (for an exception see Boatright, 2011): the grow-
ing incapacity of national governance to regulate global businesses (Beck, 2008), to compre-
hensively protect stakeholders, or to provide global public goods on the one hand (Hertz, 
2001) and the corporate engagement of business firms in public tasks originally assigned to 
the state on the other (Matten and Crane, 2005a). 
 The dominant shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance is justified by the 
residual risk borne by shareholders (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996; see also, critically, Stout, 
2002) as well as by the alledgedly optimal effect of a shareholder-concentration of corporate 
governance on social welfare (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004; 
critically, see, Elhauge, 2005). However, the diminishing steering capacity of states and the 
changing division of labor between the economic and the political system challenge these jus-
tifications. In the following, we show that the weak enforcement of contracts in many coun-
tries, the increasing significance of negative externalities such as global warming, and the 
involvement of business in the provision of public goods render the dominant conception of 
corporate governance questionable. 
 Weak enforcement of contracts 
 One reason for centrality of shareholders in the dominant approach to corporate gov-
ernance is the assumption of the comprehensive protection of a firm’s stakeholders (except 
shareowners) through contracts and the legal system (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). Accord-
ingly, the important role the ‘legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially, 
the organization of economic activity’ and the availability of ‘police powers of the state (…) 
used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-
performance’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 311, fn. 14) are emphasized. 
 However, with corporations operating beyond the reach of legal enforcement mecha-
nisms, be it in weak states or in undemocratic ones, the option of the legal protection of 
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stakeholders becomes curtailed. In countries where state agencies are either unable or unwill-
ing to protect the legitimate claims of stakeholders the claimants are often exposed to the ar-
bitrariness of powerful corporate actors. The power of stakeholders is further weakend when 
they have no choice other than to accept the terms determined by the corporate actors.  For 
example, the common infringement of labor rights in global supply chains of major electron-
ics brands (see, e.g., China Labor Watch, 2011) illustrates that even if appropriate labor rights 
exist, enforcement is weak in many countries. Still more unambiguous is the case of forced 
labor that accounts for up to 21 million workers of the global workforce (International La-
bour Organization, 2012; see also Crane, 2013). These examples illustrate that, even if there 
is some progress in the field of business and human rights law (see, e.g., Clapham, 2006; 
McBarnet, 2007), the assumption of the enforceability of contracts through the legal systems 
does not apply to the lifeworld of many workers in developing countries. More generally, 
they illustrate that many stakeholders lack any protection through functioning legal systems 
and therefore are directly exposed to risk resulting from the activities of business firms. Even 
if most multinational corporations are based in countries where the enforcement of contracts 
is strong, in the wake of globalization these firms potentially have some ties with countries 
where this assumption does not hold. Hence, the problem of weak enforcement of contracts 
between business firms and their stakeholders is of global significance. 
 Negative externalities  
 A further aspect of the limited capacity of many states to enforce laws relates to exter-
nalities such as environmental pollution (Beck, 1992). Within the constellation of national 
economies negative externalities could to some extent be limited or compensated for by pub-
lic policy and by means of law. However, this option is often unavailable where no or only 
weak enforcement mechanisms exist (see above). Banning or preventing negative externali-
ties by means of taxation (Pigou, 1932) as well as proposals for the internalization of exter-
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nalities by the allocation of property rights (Coase, 1960) are only partially viable, since con-
tractual obligations between stakeholders and firms cannot always be enforced. Due to the 
transnationality of many problems of externalities caused by corporations, as in the case of 
climate change and toxic emissions, and due to undeveloped cross-border regulation (Bradley 
et al., 1999) specific groups of stakeholders or even all of humanity are increasingly exposed 
to risks resulting from externalities generated by corporations, without the immediate chance 
of legal protection or compensation (Rockström et al., 2009). 
 Public goods 
 Strongly interrelated with the described developments is the expanding power of busi-
ness in general and of multinational enterprises in particular. Firms provide public goods 
such as education and infrastructure; they engage in the administration of rights (Matten and 
Crane, 2005a); they provide public security services (Elms and Phillips, 2009); and they par-
ticipate in global governance through the formulation of international standards (Scherer et 
al., 2006), e.g. in areas such as labor rights and environmental protection (Haufler, 2001). 
These examples demonstrating the engagament of corporations in the provision of public 
goods indicate that corporations exert significant power (Coglianese, 2007), which in many 
cases equals or even exceeds the power of state actors (Beck, 2008). Whereas in democratic 
constitutional states power exercised by the state can be controlled by democratic processes, 
on the global level corporate power is often uncontrolled. In such situations individuals be-
come exposed to corporate power without sufficient democratic authorization and control of 
corporate activities and run the risk of unjust treatment. 
 The individualization of risk  
 In states subject to democratic rule of law public authorities rely on their monopoly in 
the legitimate use of force. All stakeholders of a firm – except for the shareholders – are as-
sumed to be parties in explicit contracts that are enforceable by means of legal sanctions or to 
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be protected by law and regulations (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). The state authorities se-
cure compliance with regulations and contractual arrangements and either allocate the costs 
of negative externalities to their producers or to the society as a whole. As the sole providers 
of public goods, public authorities are controlled democratically and thereby misuse of power 
is largely prevented. Furthermore, due to its democratic entitlement and control, this exercise 
of power by state authorities is regarded as legitimate. The democratic state system acts as a 
mechanism for both minimizing and mitigating risk by limiting and socializing potential 
costs for the single citizen and for generating legitimacy for the use of power. Under condi-
tions of globalization, due to insufficient state regulation and weak enforcement, many risks 
resulting from corporate action can no longer be mitigated by national governance and there-
fore are becoming more of a threat to individuals who are increasingly directly exposed to the 
harmful consequences of corporate activity. That is, besides shareholders, other stakeholders 
need to be regarded as bearing considerable risks that result from a business firm’s activities 
from which they are not protected by law (see, e.g., Blair, 2003; Boatright, 2011). In other 
words: the risk becomes individualized (Beck, 1992). The individualization of risk resulting 
from business activities can be regarded as a notable facet of a broader societal dynamic 
characterized by an increasing significance of man-made risks that can only insufficiently be 
tackled by regulatory frameworks. To capture these developments, Beck coined the term risk 
society (Beck, 1992). 
 The re-allocation of risk from the risk-producers and the societal level to the individual 
undermines the assumption of shareholders as the sole group of stakeholders that is exposed 
to risks without protection through the law. Further, the contribution of shareholder-centered 
corporate governance to social welfare needs to be reconsidered. Jensen (2002, p. 246) ex-
plicitly relies on ‘… the government in its rule-setting function …’ to create the conditions 
necessary to resolve externality problems and admits that maximization of shareholder value 
	   13 
does not maximize social welfare when externalities exist. The incapacity of many govern-
ments to enforce contracts between stakeholders and firms, to limit or socialize negative ex-
ternalities, as well as the increasing power of business firms to unilaterally decide on matters 
of the public good can be regarded as evidence for the incongruence between firm-level effi-
ciency and social welfare (see also McSweeny, 2008). By challenging two important justifi-
cations of shareholder-centered corporate we expand the major current moral criticism of 
shareholder-centered corporate governance that relates to the concentration of control in the 
hands of shareholders (Boatright, 2004). 
Legitimacy problems of corporate governance 
 In this section we argue that the changed allocation of risk as well as the weakening 
link between firm-level efficiency and social welfare pose a severe threat to the legitimacy of 
firms and identify these developments as a challenge for the shareholder-centered approach 
to corporate governance. Legitimacy, as defined by Suchman (1995, p. 574), ‘is a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’. Organiza-
tional legitimacy can be based on three sources (Suchman, 1995): (1) the perceptions of bene-
ficial outcomes from the organization and its behavior (pragmatic legitimacy); (2) the organi-
zation’s compliance with unconscious, taken-for-granted societal expectations (cognitive le-
gitimacy); or (3) a moral judgment that is based on an argumentative process (moral legiti-
macy) in which it is judged discursively whether an activity is ‘the right thing to do’. 
 Under conditions of a functioning regulatory framework the legitimization of business 
firms in the market sphere is regarded to be ‘automatic’ (Peter, 2004: 1) due to their contribu-
tion to social welfare (pragmatic legitimacy) and their compliance of business with official 
rules (cognitive legitimacy). However, as soon as the risks produced by a business firm are 
no longer limited or mitigated by regulatory frameworks, individuals exposed to these risks 
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might suffer a loss in individual welfare. Further, such cases are often uncovered by NGOs, 
civil society groups or activists (Spar and La Mure, 2003; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). 
Subsequenly, information about corporate wrongdoing and critique can spread through media 
and the new communication technology instantaneously, and corporate legitimacy can be 
questioned globally, since a reduction of individual welfare of specific stakeholders firm 
might be regarded as a threat to social welfare by a concerned global public. Both devel-
poments can lead to the questioning of the legitimacy of this firm. That is, pragmatic and 
cognitive legitimacy are becoming less reliable sources of corporate legitimacy. For this rea-
son moral legitimacy is becoming more relevant (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). 
 Several authors emphasize the importance of corporate governance for the generation 
of organizational legitimacy. Taking a narrow view, corporate governance can be regarded as 
one mechanism legitimizing a corporation through the appointment of a corporate board 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Taking a broader view, corporate governance can be conceived 
of as a set of rules aimed at reducing business risks and thus as a guarantee mechanism 
(Gomez and Korine, 2008). By means of proper corporate governance, a corporation signals 
to potential shareholders that it practices sound risk-control. Thus corporate governance en-
hances the trust of the shareholders in the corporation and minimizes potential transaction 
costs resulting from the collection of information about risks for investments.  Building on 
this definition, we regard corporate governance as a mechanism that signals the ability of a 
corporation to control and limit risks for stakeholders and thus contributes to organizational 
legitimacy. 
 The dominant shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance, which is 
adapted to the conditions of the pre-globalization era, neither takes into account the individu-
alization of risk nor the incongruence between shareholder value and social welfare. There-
fore, this approach to corporate governance is no longer justified by the moral considerations 
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outlined above and is becoming less effective in contributing to organizational legitimacy. 
Rather, due to its disregard of the negative effects of business activities (Tirole, 1999), it po-
tentially undermines corporate legitimacy. Therefore, the question is whether alternative ap-
proaches to corporate governance are available which have the potential to consider the risks 
borne by stakeholders of a business firm and thus to secure organizational legitimacy. 
In search of new principles: alternative perspectives 
 Contesting conceptions of the purpose and objectives of a corporation and of the ap-
propriate focus of corporate governance have been discussed for decades (Berle, 1932; Clark, 
1916; Dodd, 1932; Friedman, 1970). With the aim of finding corporate governance mecha-
nisms to cope with the challenges of risk society, in the following we discuss the most influ-
ential alternative approaches to corporate governance (see also Gomez and Korine, 2005, 
2008; Scherer et al., 2012) with regard to their capacity to take into account the shift of risk 
towards stakeholders.  
 One attempt to modify corporate governance is team production theory (Blair, 1995). 
As described above, the dominant approach to corporate governance has been conceptualized 
to overcome the principal-agent problem that is seen as threatening the efficiency of a corpo-
ration defined as a nexus of contracts. The core argument of team production theory is based 
on the increasing importance of implicit contracts and the resulting shift of risk towards 
stakeholders, particularly the employees. They become risk-bearers by (in part irrevocably) 
investing firm-specific skills in a team production effort – the firm –, thereby contributing to 
value creation, without proper protection through explicit contracts. Consequently, team pro-
duction theory aims at motivating team members to actually contribute to the process of val-
ue creation as well as increasing the amount of information available for decision-making at 
the board level through participation of employees or knowledge workers (Osterloh and Frey, 
2006). 
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 However, regarding the increasing importance of negative externalities, team produc-
tion theory is constrained by the definition of organizations as teams and the resulting focus 
on team members. From this it follows that external stakeholders such as individuals and 
groups affected by corporate action who do not make some kind of investment with which 
they voluntarily enter into a bilateral relationship with a firm cannot be regarded as team 
members. According to team production theory, risk imposed on these stakeholders by a cor-
poration cannot be considered within corporate governance. 
 In line with the theory of team production, stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Don-
aldson and Davis, 1991) is based mainly on a critique of the dysfunctionalities of principal-
agent theory, the framework that constitutes the shareholder primacy view. Instead of regard-
ing managers as opportunists, stewardship theory assumes that the objectives of managers 
and shareholders correspond in general. Accordingly, stewardship theory postulates that gov-
ernance structures that do not constrain the activities of managers motivate managers to max-
imize shareholder value. One advantage of stewardship-theory lies in its emphasis on integri-
ty of managerial decision-making. However, stewardship theory seems to be unsuited to re-
spond to the challenges corporations are confronted with in the risk society. Being centered 
on shareholders as the central group of corporate governance, the reallocation of risk from the 
risk-producers and the societal level to individuals will only be taken into account if this issue 
is taken into consideration by corporate managers. However, a conflict between the interests 
of corporate shareholders and stakeholders occurs (Friedman, 1970) as soon as the considera-
tion of risks for stakeholders conflicts with the financial interests of the shareholders.  
 The concept of stakeholder democracy (Matten and Crane, 2005b), which can be re-
garded as an extension of stakeholder theories (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2010), em-
phasizes the importance of democratic participation in corporate decision-making. According 
to Gomez and Korine (2005, 2008), corporate governance can be regarded as a mechanism to 
	   17 
secure the consent of the individuals governed by corporate actions, e.g. all stakeholders. The 
authors suggest that the democratization of corporate governance is a means to achieve the 
consent of the stakeholders of a firm. Therefore, stakeholder democracy has the potential to 
take into account the interests of all stakeholders affected by the reallocation of risks and to 
thus maintain or restore the legitimacy of business firms, 
 Summing up, dominant corporate governance theory, team production theory, and 
stewardship theory all have a limited focus on specific stakeholder groups and therefore lack 
the capacity to appropriately take into account the reallocation of risks. In contrast, sugges-
tions to integrate stakeholders into organizational decisionmaking directly aim at internaliz-
ing democratic processes within the boundaries of the corporation. Such openness to dis-
course and external control potentially allows to extend the focus of corporate governance 
beyond those stakeholders immediately involved in corporate value creation to include all 
stakeholders affected by risk resulting from corporate action, be it risk resulting from insuffi-
cient enforcement of contracts, from negative externalities, or from corporate provision of 
public goods. By submitting them to democratic control, it becomes possible to ensure that 
organizational decision processes take into account the changed allocation of risks and enable 
a concurrent resolution of conflicts between a corporation and its stakeholders. 
 
From contract to social connectedness: 
Readjusting the scope of corporate governance 
In principle, stakeholder democracy has the flexibility to take into account the reallocation of 
risks that characterizes risk society by including stakeholders in corporate decision processes 
and to thus compensate for the loss of corporate legitimacy. However, this flexibility makes it 
necessary to determine (1) which stakeholders are exposed to risk resulting from the activities 
of business firms and therefore need to be included in organizational decision-making and (2) 
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how the conflicting interests resulting from this reallocation of risk can be reconciled in order 
to constitute or maintain the legitimacy of corporate action. Whereas the dominant approach 
to corporate governance theory as well as stewardship theory offer a simple criterion for se-
lecting the stakeholders subject to protection by corporate governance – namely the imperfect 
contractual relation between a corporation and its shareholders – this criterion is not applica-
ble in the face of the individualization of risk, potentially including every individual. Hence, 
another selection criterion needs to be found. 
 One appropriate starting point seems to be the concept of implicit contracts, the criteri-
on used by team production theory to determine how worthy of protection the stakeholders 
are. Implicit contracts are not formalized but are nevertheless vital elements of economic 
transactions. Taking into account this type of contract in addition to explicit contracts facili-
tates the formulation of the relation between firms and an enlarged set of stakeholders in a 
systematic way, since risk not accounted for in explicit contracts becomes conspicuous (Boat-
right, 2004, 2011). Nevertheless, despite its potential to address numerous legitimate claims 
on a corporation, the contractual view has its limits where relations between a corporation 
and its stakeholders are unidirectional, as in the case of negative externalities of the activities 
of business firms and the resulting risk for individuals. Redefining corporate responsibility by 
extending the notion of property rights to ‘both the legal aspect of property rights and the so-
cial conventions that govern (business) behaviors’ (Asher et al., 2005) seems to be a promis-
ing way to recognize the importance of a firm’s stakeholders (Blair, 2005). However, the 
possibility of defining all stakeholder relations in terms of contracts and property rights, es-
pecially under conditions of complex global interdependencies characteristic for risk society, 
seems to be limited.  
 Consequently the contract concept is not suitable for grasping the multiple relationships 
between corporations and their stakeholders. A further starting point is the concept of ac-
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countability. ‘An accountability relationship is one in which an individual, group or other en-
tity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to impose 
costs on the agent’ (Keohane, 2003, p. 139). According to Keohane (2003, p. 140), there are 
three normative criteria justifying and necessitating the accountability of an actor to specific 
groups: authorization, support, and impact. (1) Authorization defined as the conferring of 
rights from one entity upon another is seen as one normative reason for the duty of the au-
thorized to be accountable to the authorizer. (2) Political as well as financial support is re-
garded as another rationale for the obligation of the supported to be accountable vis-à-vis the 
supporters. (3) The third criterion – impact – is argued to further justify the agent’s obligation 
to accountability. As argued by Held (2002), actors who become ‘choice-determining’ for 
others and restrict the autonomy of these others need to be held accountable. 
 The issue of accountability in the shareholder-centered approach to corporate govern-
ance theory is exclusively centered on the criterion of support. Shareholders provide financial 
support for a corporation and in turn the corporation is supposed to be accountable to these 
shareholders. In the light of the growing economic and political power of corporations, the 
criterion of impact is becoming more and more relevant since corporations determine the 
choices of many people. However, due to the complexitiy of global exchange- and power-
relations, the impact of specific actions on the constraint of individual choice is increasingly 
difficult to determine in a direct way. Impact in most instances does not happen directly, but 
through intricate cause–effect chains. Hence, to develop a concept of impact capable of em-
bracing this complexity and intermediateness, we bring in the notion of social connectedness. 
According to Young (2004), to counter injustice – and therewith the constraint of individual 
choice – resulting from social and economic connectedness in a globalized economy, it is 
necessary to overcome a past-oriented liability logic. Instead, Young introduces the forward-
looking concept of social connectedness. According to her, involvement in structures leading 
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to injustice is regarded as a sufficient condition to consider an actor responsible since indi-
vidual decisions are constrained due to the impact of this actor’s actions. This becomes even 
more important because corporations not only impact on individuals by economic exchange 
but also through externalities and the provision of public goods. Under such circumstances 
impact cannot be determined following the logic of liability. Defining the impact of corpora-
tions according to the social connectedness perspective seems to be a fruitful approach with 
which to determine the scope of corporate accountability. Corporate governance, which plays 
a central role in securing corporate accountability, has to adapt to the changing economic and 
political operating conditions of corporations if it is to remain capable of fulfilling this objec-
tive. Instead of being centered on the protection of corporate shareholders, it needs to secure 
corporate accountability to all those affected by corporate action, even indirectly. The notion 
of social connectedness can be the basis for formulating the specifications of such an extend-
ed conceptualization of corporate governance, transcending the narrow focus on contractual 
relations and incorporating all risks produced by business and not covered by governmental 
regulation. 
 
Tackling the changed allocation of risk: 
The role of corporate governance 
We have described the inappropriateness of shareholder-centered approaches to corporate 
governance in the light of the individualization of risk and the weak link between the maxi-
mization of shareholder value and social welfare, and the resulting legitimacy problems of 
business. Further, we demonstrated the potential suitability of stakeholder democracy to gen-
erate corporate legitimacy by including the interests of all parties affected by a firm’s activi-
ties into corporate decisionmaking. Whereas the stakeholder approach argues that such an 
inclusion is conducive to the maximization of corporate value, we argue that this argument is 
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not strong enough to encourage corporate decision makers to consider all stakeholders that 
are exposed to the risks resulting from corporate activities. In the following we firstly show 
why corporate governance is crucial for guaranteeing a fair allocation of such risks. Second-
ly, we explain how corporate governance can be modified to achieve this objective. In addi-
tion, we analyze the compatibility of a democratization of corporate governance with law and 
illustrate ways to implement democratic principles on the level of corporate governance by 
reference to the example of stakeholder panels that are becoming popular among many mul-
tinational corporations. 
Corporate governance as a guarantee for a fair allocation of risks 
 As shown by Gomez and Korine (2008), an identifiable mechanism is necessary to sig-
nal trustworthiness and establish confidence in the governance of corporations so that inves-
tors are willing to invest in a corporation and other stakeholders consent to the activities of a 
corporation. In light of the shifting allocation of risks corporate governanc structures that 
trustworthily signal the capacity of a business firm to limit the risks for stakeholders are cru-
cial for securing organizational legitimacy for several reasons. First, the upper echelons in 
corporations wield the most power – in economic terms and increasingly also politically. At 
the top management level fundamental directions in the course of strategic decision making 
are selected (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987) that shape the 
relation between corporations and society (Kemp, 2011) and therefore influence the alloca-
tion of risks. Examples are decisions to make a foreign direct investment in a country with a 
poor human rights record or to engage in a highly disputed industry such as genetic engineer-
ing. Second, responsibility for the allocation of risks needs to be easily localized and identi-
fied by shareholders as well as by the general public. Whereas the general capacity of a firm 
to limit the risks for stakeholders is difficult to assess for external observers, the design of 
corporate governance can serve as a clear signal that business firms take into account their 
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effects on shareholders as well as on other stakeholders. Third, there is a possibility of failure 
of processes aimed at a fair allocation of risks at the lower levels of a firm. Distortions in 
moral deliberation resulting from the hierarchical structure of firms and causing a diffusion of 
personal responsibility (Rhee, 2008) cannot be ruled out. Hence, some kind of guarantee 
equivalent to a court of last resort is necessary to provide the possibility of changing the di-
rection of corporate activity and to ensure that the risks resulting from the activities of busi-
ness firms are allocated in a way that is perceived as legitimate by all stakeholders. 
Mitigating risks and maintaining legitimacy: The role of deliberation in corporate gov-
ernance 
 In the following we suggest that the opening up of corporate governance structures and 
corporate control processes to communicative processes with civil society is a suitable way to 
address the risks resulting from the activities of business firms in a procedural communica-
tion-based way and to simultaneously safeguard corporate legitimacy. As a response to the 
limited capacity of nation states to address the problems associated with the emergence of 
risk society, Beck (1992, 1997) proposed the concept of subpolitics as a way to tackle risk 
that lie beyond the reach of regulatory authorities. In subpolitics, civil society actors such as 
communities and NGOs engage in political processes with the aim to compensate for the de-
creasing regulatory capacity of the nation state. Suggestions to concretize mechanisms for 
assessing and governing risks within the scope of subpolitics (see, e.g., Bäckstrand, 2004) 
build on the theory of deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1998; Dryzek, 1999). In this theory 
deliberation is conceived as a network of argumentation aimed at controlling administrative 
power by finding rational and fair solutions for problems of public interest (Habermas, 1996). 
In the course of deliberative processes civil society actors can collectively assess and govern 
risks in a legitimate manner (see, e.g., Pellizzoni, 2001, for the case of the assessment of the 
risks of gene technology). With the increasing power of business, firms become increasingly 
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exposed to subpolitical protests (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). Whereas on the one hand such 
subpolitical activities are potentially harmful for business firms, on the other hand they open 
up a new arena for interaction between civil society and business firms, where risks of busi-
ness activities can be collectively assessed and governed in a communicative way. 
 Indeed, Palazzo and Scherer (2006) suggested such an engagement of business firms 
with civil society might be a way to manage the legitimacy of organizations in a procedural 
communication-based way. Referring to the threefold concept of legitimacy put forward by 
Suchman (1995) and described above – pragmatic, cognitive, and moral legitimacy – these 
authors argue that under the conditions of globalization the capability of business to consti-
tute pragmatic or cognitive legitimacy is decreasing. Transfering the theory of deliberative 
democracy from political science to the context of business organizations (Palazzo and 
Scherer, 2006; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), deliberation is regarded as a means for corpora-
tions to compensate for the loss of pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy. Switching to a mode 
of ’moral reasoning’ is regarded as a measure to constitute moral legitimacy by means of dis-
cursive processes when necessary and appropriate. The process of deliberation is seen as a 
way to achieve legitimate outcomes by an active justification vis-à-vis society through the 
exchange of good reasons (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). These considerations illustrate that 
the design of corporate governance according to the principles of deliberative democracy has 
the potential to tackle the risks that result from activities of business firms and to thus safe-
guard their legitimacy.  
Company law, soft law, and democratic corporate governance 
 Obviously, even if the democratization of corporate governance is an appropriate re-
sponse to the changing allocation of risks discussed above, the question remains to what ex-
tent such a radical redesign of governance structures and profound reallocation of rights is 
compatible with company law. Contrary to the common assumption that company law re-
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quires the maximization of shareholder value, the maximization of shareholder value is not a 
legal principle (Stout, 2008, see also Elhauge, 2005; Rose, 2007). Rather, corporate law sug-
gests that the purpose of the firm is to ‘serve the interests of employees, creditors, customers, 
and the broader society’ (Williams and Conley, 2005, p. 1190) and requires corporate direc-
tors to promote the long-term success of a business firm for the benefit of its various stake-
holders (Lan and Heracleous, 2010). As we have demonstrated, the democratization of corpo-
rate governance is an appropiate means for safeguarding the legitimacy and thus the viability 
of a business firm in cases where business firms operate under conditions of weak regulatory 
frameworks. In cases where there is no other means available for guaranteeing the viability of 
a business firm, an opening up of corporate governance for democratic processes therefore 
seems to be a lawful means to ensure that a firm can continue to serve the interests of its 
stakeholders as well as a means to signal this capacity to prospective shareholders (Gomez 
and Korine, 2008). In addition to the positive influence of stakeholder participation on corpo-
rate legitimacy, there is increasing evidence that close interaction with stakeholders on the 
level of corporate governance is conducive to the managment of business risks (Pirson and 
Turnbull, 2011) as well as to innovation (Spitzeck and Hansen, 2010). These considerations 
make clear that the representation of stakeholders in corporate governance is not only com-
patible with legal prescriptions. It might be helpful for maintaining or restoring corporate le-
gitimacy, thus guaranteeing the long-term success of a corporation under conditions of inef-
fective or absent regulatory frameworks. Seen from this perspective, a democratization of 
corporate governance might be in the economic interest of a firm and therefore in the imme-
diate interest of a firm’s shareholders. The idea of a corporate governance model that is by 
default attractive for stakeholder groups with allegedly diverging interests partly corresponds 
with the ideas of Black and Kraakman (1996), who propose a ‘self-enforcing model of corpo-
rate law’ for countries where the official enforcement of contracts is weak. These authors ar-
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gue that an appropriately designed set of default rules for corporate governance might even 
work under conditions of weak enforcement due to the pressure of peers, threats to the repu-
tation of a corporation, and the danger of violent protests against decisions of corporations. 
The same arguments hold as a rationale for a voluntary democratization of corporate govern-
ance as a means to tackle the shifting allocation of risks and the concomitant legitimacy prob-
lems of business. As argued by Turnbull (2000), the concept of a self-enforcing model of 
corporate law might serve as the basis for the policies of governments and development 
agencies to promote democratic forms of corporate governance. Building on this idea, in the 
following we discuss the feasibility and prospect of a legal and soft-legal enforcement of 
democratic corporate governance. 
 As demonstrated by the case of Germany, the inclusion of stakeholders in corporate 
governance can also be required by law. German law requires the inclusion of workers’ rep-
resentatives in corporate boards in firms of a certain size (see, e.g., Jürgens et al., 2000). This 
example illustrates that law can play an important role in enforcing the inclusion of different 
stakeholders in corporate governance. 
 Beyond strictly legal approaches to the democratization of corporate governance, it is 
also possible to conceive of soft law approaches to the promotion of democratic corporate 
governance. For instance, the demand of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance that 
the board of a corporation ‘should take into account the interests of stakeholders’ (OECD, 
2004, p. 24) could conceivably be complemented by a clause that requires the formal inclu-
sion of stakeholders in corporate governance. Further, more indirect effects of soft law on 
corporate governance are conceivable. For instance, as argued by Muchlinski, the provisions 
of the UN framework on human rights and business concerning the development of human 
rights compliance systems have the potential to transform the shareholder-centered model of 
corporate governance towards a model of the corporation that builds ‘upon the the implica-
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tions of stakeholder theory for the reform of corporate law and regulation (Muchlinski, 2012, 
p. 167). 
 At first glance it might appear somewhat paradoxical to conceive required democratiza-
tion of corporate governance by law or soft law as one means to address problems in areas in 
which laws are weak. However, at second glance, the described law and soft law approaches 
might serve as blueprints for indirect legal remedies of governance gaps. Whereas law is in-
capable to directly address governance gaps per definition, it is conceivable to require busi-
ness firms to open up their decision structures in their home countries as a means to address 
problematic issues in host countries. For instance, the inclusion of the representative of a civil 
society organization that promotes the protection of human rights in the board of a European 
business firm might be an appropriate means to avoid the complicity of this firm in the viola-
tion of human rights in areas where there is no proper rule of law.  
 Even if these considerations pose several essential questions concerning the selection of 
stakeholders and the redesign of governance structures, we hold that a democratization of 
corporate governance required by law or soft law might be a way to indirectly tackle govern-
ance gaps. Concerning the concrete form of such a democratization, the emerging practice of 
stakeholder panels described in the following section has the potential to offer insights. 
Concretizing democratic corporate governance: The case of stakeholder panels 
 Suggestions to modify corporate governance structures reach from the inclusion of out-
side directors into corporate boards to the comprehensive redesign of corporate governance 
structures. Ideas to achieve the latter goal comprise suggestions to increase the complexity of 
corporate governance structures by raising the number of corporate boards (Pirson and Turn-
bull, 2011; Turnbull, 1994) and to create novel instances such as ‘stakeholder liaison groups’ 
(Tricker, 2011) on the one hand and proposals to connect political decisionmaking with soci-
etal discurses within a ‘chamber of discourses’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008) on the other 
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hand. 
 In practice, it can be observed that more and more business firms interact with stake-
holders on a regular basis, often within the scope of stakeholder panels (AccountAbility and 
Utopies, 2007). In the literature (Scherer et al., 2012; Spitzeck et al., 2011) such stakeholder 
panels are described as modifications of the corporate governance structures of corporations. 
In what follows, we show that the emergence of stakeholder panels can be explained with 
reference to our considerations on the shifting allocation of risks generated by business firms 
and the role of deliberative democracy on the level of corporate governance for moderating 
these risks. Basically, the inclusion of stakeholders in corporate governance can either com-
prise information rights or participation in decision-making (Williamson, 1985). Concerning 
the case of information rights, there is a range of business firms that engage stakeholder pan-
els in the process of reporting information on social and ecological issues. For instance, the 
External Report Review Panel of cement producer Holcim has the task to ‘challenge the 
company’s approach to sustainable development… as well as to form an opinion on the com-
pany’s sustainable development performance and reporting’ (Holcim, 2012, p. 1). The state-
ments of the panel are publicized on the company’s website. Similarly, Kingfisher, a large 
home improvement retailer, publicizes the feedback of its External Stakeholder Panel as well 
as the company’s response to this feedback (Kingfisher, 2012). Such processes of review, 
assurance, and exchange of arguments conform with the principles of deliberative democracy 
insofar as they can be regarded as a form of public discussion, since the comments of stake-
holder panels on sustainability reports of business firms are in many cases published in a 
(purportedly) uncensored manner, allowing the readers to form their opinion in an unbiased 
way. 
 The direct participation of stakeholders in decision making of business firms is current-
ly less developed. Whereas there are a number of stakeholder panels that are designated to 
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inform the formulation of corporate strategies, their actual power to influence corporate deci-
sions seems to be low (see also Spitzeck and Hansen, 2010). However, we regard the emer-
gence of forums for the exchange of information between top-level managers and stakehold-
ers as a noticeable improvement of governance structures. Such forums firstly increase the 
informational basis for organizational decision-making. Secondly, they constitute an arena 
for the mutual exchange of information that is potentially conducive to mutual understanding 
and a change of practices in accordance with this. Interestingly, stakeholder panels resemble 
the ‘stakeholder advisory boards’ conceived by Evan and Freeman (1988) as a transitional 
step toward a stakeholder controlled corporation. 
 The reasons for setting up stakeholder panels are manifold. On the one hand, the input 
of stakeholder panels can be primarily regarded as an instrumental means aimed at detecting 
factors that affect the success of a company, as exemplified by the Sustainability External 
Advisory Council of Dow Chemical that addresses corporate success factors, busi-
ness/portfolio success factors, public affairs and stakeholder engagement, and trends and ex-
ternalities (Dow Chemical, 2012). However, on the other hand, in some cases the purpose of 
stakeholder panels transcends immediate economic considerations. There is evidence that the 
shifting allocation of risks described above seems to be increasingly recognized on the part of 
business. For instance, one of the stated purposes of the Sustainable Development Panel of 
energy producer EDF is to assess how well the interests of stakeholders are taken into ac-
count (EDF, 2012). Similarly, monitoring the efforts of business firms to protect human 
rights is the focus of many stakeholder panels (see, e.g., Areva, 2007; BP, 2013). This can be 
taken as evidence that business firms increasingly realize that stakeholders might be in need 
of additional protection beyond legal protection. Next, a topic that permeates many reports 
and mission statements of stakeholder panels (see, e.g., Dow Chemical, 2012; Holcim, 2012; 
Shell, 2012) is the issue of climate change, which is the most striking example for negative 
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externalities generated by business firms. Finally, the provision of public goods such as 
healthcare, education and public transport by business firms is increasingly moving into the 
scope of stakeholder panels, as the example of BP’s Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel in 
Indonesia illustrates (BP, 2013). 
 The described involvement of stakeholders in corporate governance illustrates that 
business firms increasingly recognize the risks resulting from their activities for their stake-
holders. The inclusion of stakeholders in organizational decision processes on a regular basis 
can be regarded as the attempt of business firms to address the shortcomings of a sharehold-
er-centered approach to corporate governance by transcending the casual consultation of 
stakeholders, which are often characterized by unequal power relations (Banerjee, 2008). 
Through the inclusion of stakeholders corporate governance becomes a subpolitical arena, 
which can (at least provisionally and partly) compensate for lacking governmental and regu-
latory protection of stakeholders from risks and contribute to the legitimacy of business 
firms. 
 
Concluding remarks and directions for further research 
In the pre-globalization era non-shareholding stakeholders of business firms were in many 
cases sufficiently protected by law and regulation, negative externalities were (at least partly) 
avoided or compensated by law and proper state governance, and the provision of public 
goods was a public task fulfilled by public authorities. With the diminution of public steering 
power and the widening of regulation gaps, these assumptions are becoming partly untenable. 
In many cases, stakeholders of business firms lack protection by nation-state legislation. The 
limitation of negative externalities by state authorities is becoming increasingly difficult due 
to the global reach of corporate power, the range of many negative externalities transcending 
national borders, and the weakening of national regulatory frameworks. The distinction be-
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tween the private and the public sphere is blurring because corporations often participate or 
independently engage in the provision of public goods. As a result, many stakeholders of 
business firms are increasingly individually exposed to risk that results from corporate activi-
ties and the assumed link between the maximization of shareholder value and social welfare 
is weakening – with adverse effects on the legitimacy and viability of business firms. 
 Corporate governance has the potential to address these issues. To successfully moder-
ate between the interests of individuals, of corporations, and of society and thereby to main-
tain or restore organizational legitimacy, corporate governance needs to be open to contingent 
legitimate claims on a corporation with the aim of controlling and mitigating risks resulting 
from corporate action. The suggested approach builds on stakeholder theory. However, we 
extend it insofar as we not only claim the need to consider corporate stakeholders in corpo-
rate decisions, but also demand the inclusion of all corporate stakeholders that are negatively 
affected by corporate activities into organizational decision processes. The transfer of the 
concept of deliberative democracy to the corporate level in general and to corporate govern-
ance in particular promises to tackle the risks which result from the activities of business in a 
globalized economy and to realign the objectives of business firms and society in a discursive 
way. Thus the moral deficiencies of shareholder-centered corporate governance can be ad-
dressed and the legitimacy of a business firm can be reestablished. 
 Our findings contribute to extant research on the democratization of corporate govern-
ance (see, e.g., Driver and Thompson, 2002; Gomez and Korine, 2005, 2008; Parker, 2002; 
Scherer et al., 2012; Spitzeck et al., 2011) in several regards. First, we show that shareholder-
centered approaches to corporate governance that are justified by the residual risk borne by 
shareholders or by the maximization of social welfare allegedly accruing from the maximiza-
tion of shareholder value are not appropriate in light of globalization and the individualiza-
tion of risk in risk society. For this reason, these approaches are a potential threat to the legit-
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imacy of business firms. We detail that democratic processes on the level of corporate gov-
ernance can help avoid undue risks for stakeholders, ensure the contribution of business to 
the social good, and therefore help maintain or restore the legitimacy of business. Next, we 
show that reliance on contracts as a criterion for determining the inclusion of stakeholders in 
corporate governance is increasingly inappropriate in view of the complexity of global ex-
change relations and the unilateral exercise of power through business firms. Instead, we 
suggest that the concept of social connectedness can serve as criterion for the selection of 
stakeholders to be represented in corporate governance. Finally, we show that a legally or 
soft-legally mandated democratization of corporate governance of business firms in home 
countries of a firm where law is assumed to be relatively strong might be an approach appro-
priate for indirectly tackling governance gaps in areas where law and regulation are weak. 
 Further research is firstly necessary to find ways to process and balance legitimate 
claims towards an organization and organizational efficiency. One promising step in this di-
rection is the further analysis of the compatibility of cybernetics-based approaches to organi-
zational design (e.g. Pirson and Turnbull, 2011; Romme and Endenburg, 2006) and the prin-
ciples of deliberative democracy (e.g. Dryzek, 1999; Habermas, 1996, 1998). Secondly, on 
the level of global governance, effective schemes of regulation need to be found to foster 
corporate commitment for goals that transcend the generation of shareholder value and to fa-
cilitate the adoption of more versatile forms of corporate governance. 	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